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Summary  findings
Watcr  is often not confined within territorial boundaries  Negotiated outcomes need nor maximize net bencfits
so conflicts may arise about shared water resources.  for all countrics. To some extent,  inefficiencies can be
When such boundaries lic within a federal stare, conflicts  traced to the desire to nationalize resources rather  than
may be peacefully and  efficicntly resolved under law, and  to gain from cooperativc development  The Indus Waters
if the statcs fail to reach an agreement, the federat  Treaty, for example, divided the Indus and its tributaries
government  may impose onc.  between India and Pakistan, rather  than exploir joint use
Similar international  conflicts are more difficult to  and development of the basin.
resolve because no third party has dhe authority  to  Both cfficiency and equity should be considered in
cnforce an agrcement among national states, let alone  agreements for managing international water resources.
impose one.  The 1959 Nile Waters Agrement  between Egypt and
Such international  agreements musr be self-enforcing.  Sudan did not reserve warer for upstrcam riparians-
Efficient outcomes may emergc, but arc not guaranteed  notably, Ethiopia- A basinwvidc  approach could make use
International  law may emphasize the doctrinc of  of Nile waters more efficient and benefit all three
'equitable  utilization" of water  resources, but there is no  riparians: Egypt, Ethiopia, and Sudan. Construction  of
dear  definition of what this implies,  dams in Ethiopia would give that country irrigation,
In the Colorado  River case, the polluter  (the United  would eliminare the annual Nile flood, and would
States) agreed to pay for atl the costs of providing the  increase the total water av-ailable  to Ethiopia and Sudan.
downstream  neighbor (Mesico) with clean watr.  In negotiations over use of the Nile, the net benefits of
In the Rhine River case, the downstream  country (the  basinwide managemnent,  and the ways these three
Netherlands) agreed to pay part -but  not all -of  the  riparians could share equitably in gains, should be
cots  of cleanup.  demonstrared.
En  the Colombia River Trcaty case, both partics agreed  In the 198Ds, Egypt did not run short of water because
o incur construction costs on their side of the border  Sudan did not rake its full allocation and because
and share evenly the gross (not the net) benefits- This  Ethiopia did not withdraw anv warer from the basin.
division may well have yielded a smaller net benefit to  Increased water demand will inevitably create tension
the United States than unilateral development would  between these sta
have, but thc United States ratified the treaty.
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Water resources are "international" if they are "common to several States" (Caponera  1980).
Examples include rivers and lakes which border two or more countries, rivers which flow from
one country into another, and shared ground water resources)  In all such cases, use by one
country of the shared water resource affects  the quantity  or quality  available  to another country.
This interdependence  is both great in extent and pervasive.  As Table 1 shows, there are about
200 shared river basins, distributed more or less evenlv across the African, American, Asian.
and European contnents.2 While most of these are shared by only two countries, 13 are shared
by 5 or more countries, and 4-the  Congo, Danube. Nile and Nieer basins-are shared by 9 or
more countries?' According to United Nations (1978), international  river and lake basins make
up about 47 percent of the world's continental  land area.  On the continents  of Africa, Asia, and
South America, shared river and lake basins makle  up at least 60 percent of the total land area-
Shared groundwater  resources are also common.  and many acquifers  underly several countries. 4
'The United Nations (1975) includes "atmospheric  water' and "frozen water resources" as
further examples.
tUnited Nations (1978) lists 214 internationally shared river basins.  The discrepancy
between the two estimates  could be due to differences  in definition- United  Nations (1978, p-2)
notes that "Discrepancies  between basin areas given in this report and those from other sources
can be attnrbuted  to different interpretations  of the location of the watershed."  Whatever the
reasons for the discrepancy, since the number of countries and their borders has chang,ed  since
these two inventories were taken, these aggregate  figures should not be taken to be accurate but
indicative of the actal  number.  However, it should be noted that both sets of figures are
controversiaL  Biswas (1993, p.- 171) argues that the number of international  river basins is
significantly  higher dtan 214:
"A good example of this serious undercounting could be indicated by the number of
rinternational  ivers between India and Bangladesh.  The UN study identified only one
mega-basin, the Ganges-Brahmaputra,  which is shared not only by India and Bangladesh
but also by China. Nepal and Bhutan-  It should be noted that during one of the past
meetings of the India-Bangladesh  Joint Rivers Commission, Bangladesh  identified  more
an  140 water systems that are common  to both countries."
3According  to United Nations (1978), the Danube is shared by 12 countries, including  three
which have since been reconfigured: the USSR, Yugoslavia,  and Czeckoslovakia.
4The  Northeastern African aquifer  underlies  Libya, Egypt, Chad, and Sudan- The Northem
Sahara Basin is shared by Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya. The Chad aquifers are shared by Chad.
Niger, Sudan, Nigeria, and Cameroon-  Another aquifer lies beneath Saudi Arabia, Bahrain,
Qatar and the United Arab Emirates  Groundwater resources are also shared by countries in
Europe, Southeast  Asia, the Indian Subcontinent,  and Latin America. See Vlachos (1990).-2-
TABLE 1
Number of Shared River Basins by Regicn
Number of Countries Sharing the Basin_  _
IRegion  [6Areall  213  1 4  |[61  71 81  |91  10  TotalI
Africa  A  3  2  6  _  2  1  - 3  - 17
B  -30  8  _  _  _  _  38
Americas  A  10  2  - I  _  1  _  - 14
B  43  3  - _  _  _  _  46
Asia  A  7  5  2  _  2  _  _  _  16
B  20  3  1  _  _-  _  - - 24
Europe  A  2  -1  - - -1  5
B  35  5  - _  - _  _  _  40
Total  A  20  11  8 2243  34  35  16  52
B  128  19  1  - - - -148
148  30  9  2-  4  3  - 3  1  200
Notes:  1  Area A (B) comprse  more (less) than 100,000 square kilometers
2 La Plata, Elbe
3 Chad, Volta, Ganges-Brahmaputra,  Mekong
4  Zambezi, Amazon, Rhine
s Niger, Nile, Congo
6 Danu1e
Source:  Panel of Experts on the Legal and Institutional  Aspects of Internaiional
Water Resources Development  (1975), Annex VII.-3  -
Interdependence  is particularly acute for some countries.  Table 2 lists the counties  which rely
most on waters originating in other countries.  Egypt obtains all its water from the Nile, 97
percent of which originates in other counties.  The vast majority of the countries listed in the
table are low- or middle-income  economies; only 6 of the 31 countries lised in Table 2 are high-
income economies. 5
When there is international interdependence,  there is no guarantee that the allocation of water
resources will be efficient. To take a famous example, consider the "prisoners' dilemma" game,
shown in Figure la  There are two counties,  A and B.  Both share a common  aquifer, and both
f:ce a binary choice: to extract the water at a High or Low rate.  Within each cell, the number
on the left is A's  payoff and the number on the right is B's.  Each country prefers a higher
payoff to a lower payoff, but does not care one way or the other what payoff the other country
receives-  Despite this assumption of self-interest, the two countries are interdependent insofar
as each county's  realized payoff depends not only on its own choice for a rate of extraction but
also on the choice made by the other country.
FIGURE 1
(a) Prisoners'  Dilemma Game
B
Low  High
LOW  5,5  2,6
A
High  - 6,2  3,3
What  strategy  should  the  players  pursue?  Consider  first  player  A.  Because of  the
interdependence  that exists, player A, in deciding whether to choose High or Low, will wish to
consider how the payoffs it receives depends on player B's strategy.  Suppose B chooses Low.
Then A receives a payoff of 5 if it chooses Low and a payoff of 6 if it chooses High.  The latter
payoff is greater, and so given that B  chooses Low, A's  best response is to  choose High.
Suppose now that B chooses High.  Then A receives 2 if it chooses Low and 3 if it chooses
High.  Again, the latter payoff is greater, and so given that B chooses High, A's best response
is to choose  High.  But this means that A should choose High whatever  B chooses.  Choosing
5hucome classifications  are taken from World Bank (1992).-4-
TABLE 2
Dependence on Imported Surface Water
}  Percet  of  Percent  of
Country  Total Flow  Country  Total Flow
Originating  Originating
Outside of Border  Outside of Border
Egypt  97  Iraq  66
Hungary  95  Albania  53
Mauritania  95  Uruuacy  52
Botswana  94  Germany.  51
Bulgaria  91  Portugal  48
Netherlands  89  Yugoslavia  43|
Gambia  86  Bangladesh  42
Cambodia  82  Thailand  39  -
Romania  82  Austria  3
!Lxembourg  80  Pakistan  36
Syria  79  Jordan  36
Congo  77  Venezuela  35
Sudan  77  SenegaI  34
Paraguay  70  Belgium  33
Czechoslovakia  69  Israel'  21
Niger  68
Notes:  Although  only  21 percent  of Israel's  water  comes  from  outside current  borders,  a
significant fraction of  Israel's  fresh  water  supply comes from  disputed  lands,
complicating the calculation  of the origin of surface water supplies.  This percentage
would be affected by a political settlement  of the Middle East conflict
Source:  Gleick (1992), Table IV. p. 18 Table 1-5-
High  is  therefore  a  domtinan  strategy.  Since the game  is symmetric,  choose  Hich  is also  a
dominant  strategy for B.  The (Nash) equilibrium to this game is thus for both players to choose
High and to receive a payoff of 3 each.  Notice,  however.  that both parties would receive higher
payoffs  if they both chose Low.  The equilibrium  to the game is inefficient.
Of course,  this  much is well known.  But what is novel about such situations  in  international
relations?  After  all,  aquifers  are  also  shared  by  local  communities  and  states.  To  see  the
novelty,  consider the following solution to the dilemma.  Suppose that both parties negotiate an
agreement  which  specifies that if either  party chooses High.  it would have to pay a fine to the
other  party  equal  to  2.  Then the  game  appears  as  in Figure  lb.  If B  chooses  Low and  A
.doesn't,  A receives  apayoff of 6.  as in the original game.  but must now pay a fine of 2: hence,
A's  pavoff  becomes  4.  B receives  a payoff  of 2 plus  the fine  for  a  total payoff  of  4.  The
payoffs  are the same if A chooses Low  and B chooses  High.  It can nowr  be seen  that the best
strategy  for each player  is to choose  Low, whatever  the other player  chooses.  The agreernent
thus  makes  choosing  Low a  dominant  strategy.  The  equilibrium  to  the altered  game  is thus
efficient-
Figure  1




Low  5,5  4,4
A
High  4,4  3-3
However.  to  effect  such  an outcome  requires  much more  than the mere  existence  of such  an
agreement.  What  is  required  is  that  the  agreement  be  binding  on  both  parties.  In  an
intranational  dispute,  parties which  freely commit to an agreement  can be made .to comply  with
the terms of the agreement  by the courts.  And of course the enforcement  of contracts  is one of
the principal  functions  of judicial  systems.  In  an international  dispute,  however,  agreements
between  countries  cannot be enforced  by a third party.  International  agreements  must be self-
enforcing.  Self-enforcement  is a  severe  constraint,  and  may  mean  that  international  water
resources  potentially  cannot be managed  as efficiently  as intranational  resources.-6  -
The nature of the interdependence that exists among countries can be complex, and often bares
little  resemblence to  the  prisoners'  dilemma  game.  Many  shared  water  problems  are
unidirectional, as in the case of upstream countries causing harn  downstream.  For example,
soil erosion in  an upstream countey may damage dams and port  installations downstream.
Similarly, use of water upstream for irrigation  or as a receptor for pollution reduces the quantity
or quality available to downstream countries.  However, the externality does not always work
in this direction.  The construction of dams for irrigation, hydroelectricity production or flood
control in a  downstream country may cause flooding upsteam-  Furthermore, international
externalities related to*  water use are not always negative.  For example, development of port
facilities downstream may benefit upstream countries.  Finally, even where externalities are
reciprocal,  as  in  the  prisoners'  dilemma, the  nature of  the  game may  well  differ: joint
development of irrigation, hydroelectric, water transportation or flood control projects can yield
all  parties greater  net benefits than purely nationalistic development, as  in  the  prisoners'
dilemma,  but  economies of  scale in  the  construction of  such projects may mean that an
inefficient outcome can easily be avoided. While this paper is hardly exhaustive in its coverage,
it does consider a number of different forms of interdependence.
The fact that counties  are interdependent  means that they can potentially be made better off if
they can cooperate in managing international  water resources, and in practice such cooperation
is typically  codified in international  agreemements. There is, in fact, an astonishing number and
variety of such agreements.  Two surveys compiled by the Food and Agriculture Organization
of the United Nations (1978, 1984) list 3,707 agreements, most of which are bilateral.  The frst
such  agreement,  a  unilateral  declaration by  Emperor  Charlemagne granting  freedom  of
navigation to a monestary, dates back to the year 805.  Table 3 lists n. number of international
water agreements. some of which will be discussed later in the paper.6
Of course, the fact that international agreements exist does not mean that they achieve the full
cooperative outcome-the outcome where the actions (water extraction rates, pollution emission
levels, etc) of parties are chosen to maximize the net benefits of all affected countries taken
toogether  (Low,  Low in the prisoners'  dilemma game).  One obvious indicator of the success of
an international water agreements is the number of affected countries which are also parties to
the agreement. Many agreements  are "incomplete"  in the sense that the number of parties is less
than the number of countries affected.  As examples, the Nile is shared by 9 countries, and yet
the  1959 Nile Waters Agreement was negotiated by just  two.  Egypt and  Sudan.  A  1951
agreement on the Mekong River excluded Burma and China, which share the river's  upper
reaches,  partly  because  the  upper  basin was  seen  to  be  less  attractive for  agricultural
development and pardy because relations between these countries and those in the lower basin
(Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Vietnam) were bad at that time. Paraguay  and Brazil cooperated
'There also exist a number of European Community directives relating to water which are
not counted in the figures mentioned above or included in Table 3.  These directives may also
be viewed as international agreements, but they are -negotiated  within a common institutional
environment.TableS3-  :  Intasdoml Water  Agreea4t 
Ageacmt  Datet.  Parties  Objective
Revised  Convent  on the  IS6  Panicc. Grand  Duchey  of Bada.  To esablish a Centr! Commission  for dc  coletivic regulation  of naviation an
Navigation  of  tb.  Rhine  Bavaria.  Grand  Dadcyaf  the Rbine
Hessi.  Holland. A  Pussi
Mexico-Unised  Stares  1S39  Mexico, U.S.  To esublish an Iniodnul  BouIndazy  Water Commis  which bas dte
Boundary  Wams  Conv  non  auoniy  lo reslvc  pmblan rdbf  wn  wh Rio  GrAde  gRio  Bnvo)  and.
Colorado  Riven. -T  Abc  I111  agrecmemw  sfngtmd  in 1944. and tie
Comnmissnt  nOW  also prepas  plans for fload control  and hydmoelecmcuieides.
:_______________________  _________  san  regulaes  de srage  of Rio Grae  Watcr  -
OUtce Stites-Canada  1l  Cana,  U5  To see up  e  m  o  loini  Commjsseon.  which has die aubthrity  to rule ou
Boundasy  Waters  Treaty  applicaos  for paricular diversions.  obsrtons.  ant adterworh  which  asiect
__________  thedi  boundary  wjater
Conernton to Regulate dhe  1927  Spain.  Poraal  To csablish a Commission  which would  expropriat pIpertyD  be  used  for
Hydz-Elcuic  D-fcvlopmcm  bydrraeceu  devdopment.  od  supernse consructon  and  opeaton  of such
olthe Inernaionl  Sccion of  . fcilifie
the River Douvo
Convention  Rega.ding  th  1948  Bulgaria. Czrkslovakia,  To cre  tree  istr  whkih  c  mamnge  COlletve navigation  of  the
Regime  of N4avigaion  on the  Hudgria.  Romania.  t.  Danbh..
DamCbe  UkanlcraUSSR  ad Yugoslii.  .
Apecn~ezgBetwen Aish  19SO  Amscri Bavai'  To establsh a company.  half award by each of fnc partie  m de Agrement
and Bavia.  Concerning  which is automed  a  constuct  nd opers  hydoeleeric  faifities  along  the
Ansnriz-Bavnr  froIder.  and ma  produc, sell  s  disbute  de power.
HydroclecuieCompy  '  ,'11-
Edmand River  Delta  1950  Afglunimn. 1ran  To creat  a Coemssion  whic would cole  ad  rview  dare  on the rir.  and
Agr-  recommed metods  by which  Ils  agred  share of the water is m be aload
._  _  g  ~~o  Iran'.  I 
Suoat  of the Commii.  for  19S1  Cambodia.  Laos. T4iland,  To esublisha Commei  so  failicare wacr znstnces devclopmenin the Lower
Coordination  of  Investigailons  VietnaM  Mekong  Basin.
ol de  LowcrlMckuog  Basin
AgreenanmConrg  the  1953  Syria Jordan  To cream alointCommission which would  masgeutilization  ordie  YaTrmk
UTizion  of  t.e YaMnink  Bacin parculay  in  speco  iigtion  ad hydleeciciLy  ge  tio
Waters
Agrecuenton the Eosi Proccr  1954  Indi.  Nepl  To creat  a Commi  which would  r issues  eating  DO  te  co  n
by India of hydldctri  ikripion.  flood connol and soil eosio  preventive
faciltiean  thesi  River. 
.greemcn oloir  BReserch  1956  USSR. China  To cary  ourjoinr research  operdons to demin  e  natrl  resourcn anti the
Operanons  on the Amar Rivr  - prospes  for developing  de prductvcposnal  of these wates
Basin and th  ATgun  River
[AgrernenrBezwen  1959  Gtecec.  Yugoslavi.  To estabIsh a join Commission  which would sady  din potential  for. and the
Yugoslaviaand Grce  spevkis  and inspctot  hdo-econa.ieprojeera.
Coreniog  Hydro-Economic
Questions
Agrement for the Complet  1959  Egypt. SutbA  To suevise  joinm  resarch  and 'he conaction  and opeatiof  approved
Utlizaion  ofate Nile Wers  prt  dotaw  up wrng  arrangement for wo  in Sudan and  for
respoxing  . watcr shortags: to make armngcm=ets  wit  otdercancmics  on the
control  of die agreed smau  of Nile ware consuwxpitm  adl t  negota  wit
___________  ~~~~~~~~~~~~~other  riparian countries  on  -m  corcernirag  the Nile.
The Indus Wars  Treay  16  Idia.  Pakiastn  To esblish  an Indus  Commission  to promote  coopeaion  im  th  dcvtlopment  of
the  shared  v.n
Ace  Rgrding  Navigation  -d  163  Cameroon, Ioy  Com  Repablic  To c  t a Commission  to coardiczt  and promot  studies  and prognmmcs
Ecooomic  Cooperation  of Dahomey.  Guinea.  Upper  elatig  the utilization  and dcv_copmesof  the rsoumcs of tie Niger basin.
Bctween  the  Surs rofth  Vola. Mali  Nigr.  Nieria.
Niger Basin  Chad
Convention  an the Senegal  1963  MauiLana  Guinca.  Senegal.  To establish  a Commit.c a rcguate  navgan.  and ro coonlate  study and
Basin  Mali  work prgmmes  forte  devlopmnt  of the  Sa  River. Rtauiansj'n
usdcruketo  notify the Coannuc  of project  which might  modi  the qu=nery  or
____________________  _  ______________________  quali  y  oft  h.  sared  watr
Treaty  for the Plan  BasIn  1969  Azgendo  Beivia  Bazil.  To  establish an  lccrgavcrmnetnl  CoOrdiang  Commicee  whih  would carty
Parsa  y. Uruuy  out reseach  on dt  basin. coordite  the exhange  of  infomation.  and execute
_._____________  ______  dedsions  taken  by die Foreign  Minsce.-8-
in the construction of the Itaipu Dam on the Parana River, but Argentina was not a party to that
agreement, even though the darn holds enough water to  flood all  of  north-east Argentina.
Finally,  an agreement signed by  India and Nepal in December 1991 to construct jointly  a
number of water projects excludes Bangladesh, which is certain to be affected by resulting
changes in the flow of the Ganges (Gleick, 1992).
Effective regimes for cooperation in the  management of  international water resources  are
important because water is often scarce, and its efficient provision and use is essential to  the
development of poor countries.  Precisely because of this, shared water resources are also a
source of international conflict; examples include disputes between India and Pakistan over the
Beas-Sutlej and Ravi rivers, between India and Bangladesh  over the Ganges waters, between
Chile and  Bolivia over the  Lauca River,  between Mexico and  the  United States over  the
Colorado, and of course between Israel and its Arab neighbors over the waters of the Jordan.
The purpose of this paper is to develop, and apply, an analytical framework for evaluating the
problem  of  international cooperation in  the  management of  international water  resources.
Section 2 presents a  number of case studies.  Section 3 develops a  theory of  international
cooperation applied to water.  Section 4 concludes with some final remarks.
2.  Case Studies
To motivate the paper it will prove useful to begin with some real examples of how intemational
water resources have in fact been managed. The three case studies that follow do not cover all
issues that are of interest, and we shall consider further examples later in the paper.  What these.
case studies do provide is a perspective on the political  economy of international  water resource
management.
2.1 The Columbia River Treaty
The  1909  Canada-United States  Boundary Waters  Treaty  created  the  International Joint
Commission (IIC),  which was empowered to review projects that would affect the flow of
boundary waters and to recommend solutions to water resource and other boundary problems.
In 1944. after both Canada and the United States had come to understand their mutual interest
in developing hydro-power and flood control facilities on the Columbia River,  the IJC was
instructed to investigate "where in its judgement further development of the water resources of
the river would be practicable and in the public interest from the points of fiew of the two
governments" (LeMarquand, 1977, p. 6).  The TIC  made its recommendations  in 1959.  These
included three different proposals for developing the river, and recommended principles for
apportioning the net benefits of the development between the two countries.  The IJC reports
formed the basis for formnal  negotiations  between the two governments, and the Columbia River
Treaty was signed in 1961. The treaty was ratified by the United States in this same year, but
negotiations between the province of British Columbia and the federal government of Canada
delayed ratification by Canada until 1964.9-9.
The Treaty has been called a "signal achievement"  (Krutilla, 1966, p. 69).  Nevertheless,  it is
remarkable that after 20 years of planning  and negotiation  between  just two countries, a treaty
should include projects that are "..-uneconomic and unnecessary...." and represent "-..a net loss
to both countries' (LeMarquand, 1977, p.  53),- The reason is primarily due to changeg which
occurred between the time the treaty was first signed in 1961 and the time it was ratified by
Canada three years later. These changes arose from negotiations  between  the province  of British
Columbia and Canada.
The Columbia River posed two problems to the United  States.  One was flood damage (a flood
in  1948  illed  50 people and caused more than $100 million in  damage).  The other was a
potential for increased hydro-electricity  production. The hydroelectric facilities already on the
river were rn-of-the-river.  By not regulating  the flow of water, water passed over the spillways
during periods of peak flow.  Storage would not only control flooding, but allow water flows
to be evened out and hence to increase  the total value of electricity production at existing sites-
The best sites for water storage were upstream  in Canada. and development of these would have
the fuirther  benefit of substantial  hydro-electric  power production in Canada-
One reason why the treaty took so long to be accepted  was conflict between  Canada and its own
province  of British  Columbia- As an example of the game being played out between  Canada and
British Columbia, the province  was in favour of a proposal made by the Kaiser Corporation to
build a storage facility in British Columbia and return to the province 20% of the increased
power production generated in the United States as a result of the project (Kaiser itself was to
receive 50% of this power).  The proposal was attractive  to the British Columbia government
because it would return benefits  to the province  quickly. However, Canada opposed the scheme
because it would reduce the total  net benefits of  basin-wide development compared with
alternative proposals. To block British  Columbia's acceptance  of the project, Canada passed the
International Rivers Improvement Act, which required federal approval for works on rivers
which flowed into the United States.
The case illustrates the imcentive  to make threats, and the problem of making credible threats.
The United States believed dtha the existing status quo did not represent the true bargaining
position for Canada. While the Canadian side of the basin ..as largely undeveloped,  the United
States believed that  Canada would have to develop its side of the Colunbia to meet its own
increasing  need for power- Development  of hydro power  upstream  by Canada would  effectively
regulate the flow of water downstream to the benefit of the United States.  Of course it was
unlikely that the flow that was most attractive to Canada would also be most attractive  to the
Umited  States.  However, the United States would receive  a significant  portion of the benefit of
coordinated development  at no cost.
Partly because of this,  Canada considered an alternative development proposal in order to
strengthen its bargaining position.  This alternative was to divert the Columbia into the Fraser
basin.  If Canada were to carry out such a diversion,  the United  States would receive  no benefit
and would lose the advantages of integrated development  of the Columbia basin.  However,
-the Fraser diversion was considered too expensive' (LeMarquand, 1977, p.  60).  The
"  scheme was generally considered impracticable  on both sides of the border.  Thus its value
as a bargaining position was lessened" (LeMarquand, 1977, p. 61).  In other words, the threat
to divert the Columbai was not cred-ble- 10-
Where this threat failed, another succeeded. In the late-1950s,  a proposal  to develop the Peace
River in  northem British Columbia was shown to produce the same amount of  power as
development  of the Columbia  The Peace River power would be more costly to deliver to the
major consuming  areas in the southwest,  but would meet the provincial  govermnent's objective
of developing  the north.  According to LeMarquand (1977, p. 62):
-The province made it known  that it would postpone  development  of the Columbia  until
it received terms that were favourable  to the province. This threat was taken seriously
by the United States and no doubt helped pave the way to signing of the 1961 treaty-"
The province  did  not drop  the proposal  to develop the Peace River after  the treaty  had been
signed, because ratification by Canada would require acceptance  by British Columbia, and the
provmice  used its threat to develop the Peace River to extract better terms from the federal
gOovernment.  The agreement reached between the provincial  and federal governments allowed
British Columbia to pay for construction  of the Columbia River projects by selling its share of
the benefits of the agreement to the United States.
Two proposals  for dividing the gains to cooperation  were considered. The first would subtract
the net benefits of unilateral action from those of joint action, and share the difference.  The
second,  proposed by the BC itself, would require that each country " --assume responsi-bility  for
providing  that part of the facilities  needed  for the cooperative  development  that is located  within
its own  territory"; that -Cooperative  development  of the water resources of the Columbia River
basin should result in advantages  in power supply, flood control, or other benefits, or savings
in cost to each country.  as compared  with alternatives  available  to that country'; and that 'where
such sharing would not result in an advantage  to each country-.., there should  be negotiated and
agreed upon such other division of benefits or other adjustments  as would be equitable to both
countries  and would make the cooperative  development  feasible' (Krutilla, 1966, p. 83). Hence,
the second proposal would divide the gross benefits of cooperative  developmenL
The treaty adopted this second proposal (KmtiLla,  1966, p. 70):
"ln exchange for the stream regulation  provided by the Canadian storages, the United
States agreed to share equally the increase '.a dependable  capacity and average energy
at United States head plants on the U.S. reaches of the Columbia downstream, and to
advance payment in amount equal to one-half the estimated damage reduction in the
flood plain of the lower Columbia.'
Krutilla (1966) believes that the gross benefits formula leaves the United States worse off
compared  to the alternative  of developing  the Columbia  nver unilaterally. Why then would the
U.S. agree to the terms of the treaty? Krutilla (1966, p. 96) offers an explanation:
"Suppose  that the Columbia  Treaty is regarded not as an isolated  affair between Canada
and the United States in which the benefits to either party are tied to the outcome  of the
specific  negotiations,  but rather as one of many matters on which the two countnres  must- 11  -
come to mutual accommodation:  in that event, it is not at all clear that the division of
the nominal  gains is inequitable. The vital interests of the United States were in no way
affected in the Columbia matter.  It was an area in which the United States could make
an attractive  arrangement  in exchange  for concessions  perhaps  involving  North American
continental defense or perhaps other areas in  which the vital interests of the United
States are at stake.  Unless one knows all the elements of the broader background,
therefore, one cannot properly judge the equity of the Columbia  Treaty terms."
2.2 The Indus Waters Treaty
Conflict over the use and distibution  of the waters of the Indus basin dates back to the
beginning  of the 19h centuy.  But 7 as these were intranational  conflicts,  they could be resolved
by the central government (Kinnani, 1990, p. 201):
"[rhel  first major dispute was resolved m  1935 through arbitration by the Anderson
Commission  appointed  by the cental  govermment-  As the demand for irrigation water
increased, a  new dispute emerged and  it was again resolved in  1942 by  a  new
commission (the  Rao  Commission) appointed by  the  central government  The
procedures followed  to resolve  the disputes  on both occasions  were sinlan  The central
government  had the responsibility  and authority  to settle  disputes  between the provinces;
it appointed  commissions  comprising  representatives  of the provinces and chaired by a
neutral expert to arbitrate; the commissions  were given the powers to decide the issues
if the parties failed to agree- the decisions  of the commissions  were final and binding;
and the provnces  succeeded  in managing  confficts  by following  this system."
When the Indian subcontinent  was partitioned in 1947, the Indus basin, including  an irrigation
system, was divided between India and Pakistan.  The waters feeding Paistain's  irrigation
supplies were on the Indian side of the border, and in 1948 India diverted these waters away
from  Pakistan.  Although the canals feeding Pakistan's irrigation -system were eventually
reopened, conflict between the two countries continued as India claimed sovereign  rigbts over
the  waters passing through its territory.  Palistan  proposed to  settle the  conflict through
arbitration, but India refused.  The dispute threatened war.
The World Bank then offered to help resolve the dispute. and both India and Pakistan agreed.
Negotiations  between the three parties began in 1952. At first the World Bank emphasized  the
advantages  of joint use and development  of the Indus basin managed  as a single water resource.
Concerns over sovereignty, however, made this proposal unacceptable.  In 1954, the World
Bank changed tack. and proposed dividing the Indus and its tnrbutaries. India was offered the
three eastern rivers (Ravi, Beas and Suflej),  while Pakistan  was offered  the three western rivers
(Indus, ihelum and Chenab).  Canals  were to be constructed  to divert waters from the western
rivers to replace  Pakistan's irrigation  supplies  from the eastern rivers. Construction  of these was
to be paid by India.  Once these canals had been constucted, waters from the eastern rivers
would cease to flow to Pakistan.- 12-
Pak-istan  believed that the western  rivers would not adequately  replace the country's histonrc  use
of the eastern rivers, and studies by both Pakistan and the World Bank confirmed that storage
dams would also have to be constructed  on the western rivers to ensure an adequte  supply.  The
World Bank then amended  its orginal proposal to include storage dams in the project to replace
Pakistan's use of the eastern rivers.  The cost of contructing both the link canals and the storage
dams. however. was high, and India refused to pay; it argued that the dams were not needed  and
that its liability should be based on the Bank's original proposal
The Bank responded to this new stalemate with external financing for the replacement works
(supplied by Australia, Canada, Germany, New Zealand, the United Kingdom, Italy and the
United States).  This was enough to  resolve the dispute. and in September 1960 India and
Pakistan signed the Indus Waters Treaty.  The treaty prescnrbed that construction of the
replacement works in Pakistan should be completed within 10 years, and this was in fact
achieved.
In addition to resolving  this dispute, the treaty includes  provisions for managing  potential future
disputes. The treaty establishes  a permanent  Indus Commission.  made up of one commissioner
from each countrv.  The commission  is required to meet regularly to discuss potential disputes
as well as cooperative arrangements  for the development  of the basin.  Either party must notify
the other of plans to construct any engineering  works which would affect the other party, and
provide data to the other party about such works.  If a dispute cannot be resolved by the
commission,  then the matter may  be taken up by intergovernuenLal  negotiations  or, failing  these.
arbitration.
Yet, in the 30 years since the treaty was signed, neither party has proposed a joint project for
development  of the basin.  Controversy has arisen over the design and construction  of facilities
on both sides of the basin.  Some disputes have been resolved; others are pending.  Still, the
treaty may have been successfuI  (Kirmani. 1990. p. 202):
'It is almost three decades since the treaty was signed, but both India and Pakistan have
implemented  its provisions faithfully. They made remark-able  progress in developing  the
water resources  allocated to them and achieved self-sufficiency  in food production. The
Indus Waters Treaty is one of the most remarkable examples of a treaty that led to
successful  management  of conflicts between  sovereign  riparian  countries of a large river
basin and served to promote development  and prosperity in both countries."
2.3 Convention on the Protection of the Rhine Against Pollution by Chlorides
The Rhine basin passes through the territory of nine countries-  The main stem of the river,
extending from Lake Constance in Germany  to the outflow  of the river into the North Sea in the
Netherlands, passes through  just four countries--the  above two plus France and Switzerland-
The International  Commission  for the Protection  of the Rhine Against  Pollution was established
in 1950.  Its tenure was to be limited, but the 1963 Berne Convention  established a permanent- 13 -
basis for the Commission.  The Commission has no real authority, but it does coordinate th,e
collection of water quality data along the river and makles  recommendations  to member states
regardig  environmental quality-  However, these recommnedations require the unaimous
agreement by all parties (oriinally,  parties to the Convention included the above four countnes
plus Luxembourg; in 1979 the agreement was amended, and the European Economic Community
became a signatory).  Because of its lack of authority and the unanimity rule, the Commission
was unable to have any real effect on its own.
The Rhine suffers from pollution of many types, salt pollution being one of the most serious.
Although salt does not pose serious problems for human health, in high concentrations, salt can
cause damage  to agriculture- In the early 1970s, salt concentrations  at the Dutch-German  border
often exceeded 300 mg/I.  It was at this time that international negotiations were convened to
examine the control of salt emissions into the Rhine.
At the tine,  there was one major polluter: a potash mine in France k-nown  as Les Mines de
Potasse d'Alsace.  The mine acually emitted about 40% of salt entering the Rhine, but control
of  emissions from other  industial  sources was  " .considered  to  be virtually  impossible"
(LeMarquand, 1977, p  104).  Hence, negotiations centered on reducing emissions from the
French potash mine.  The problem for negotiation was to decide by how much emissions from
the French mine were to be reduced, and how the costs of effecting those reductions were to be
shared by the four nrpanrans-
In  1972, a  Conference of  the Ministers on  the Pollution of  the Rhine  agreed to  limt  the
concentraon  of  chloride ions at the Dutch frontier to  200 mgfl.  To meet this objective,
emissions from the French mine were to be reduced by 60 kg/sec beginning in 1975.  These
emissions were to be stored deep underground.
The cost of underground storage was originally estimated to be about 100 million francs, and
the four riparians agreed to divide this cost as follows: France and Germany would each pay
30% of the cost, the Netherlands would pay 34%, and Switzerland would pay 6%-
After this agreement in principle was reached, a new study on the project estimated  that the costs
of the project could be up to five times more expensive  hn  originaly  estimated.  France
proposed  that the original cost sharing formula  be extended to cover this much greater  cost, plus
inflation and any  contingency  in the event of cost overrn.  At this point  negotiations  stalled
and entered a  period of deadlock.  Finally,  in  1976, an agreement was reached to  reduce
emissions from the French mine by just 20 kg/sec at a cost of 132  million francs.  This cost was
to be shared according to the same percentages negotiated four years earlier.
This agreement-known as the Convention on the Protection of the Rhine Against Pollution by
Chlorides-acknowledged the earlier negotiated target of a maximimum chloride ion content of
200 mg/l at the German-Netherlands  border, and the earlier target of reducing emissions at the
French mine by  60 kglsec.  The agreement stipulated that this target was to be  "achieved
gradually."  The agreement was very  specific on the initial 20 kg/sec  reduction, but said- 14-
that"...after  consideration of  the  results  obtained during  the  initial  stage...[the  French
Government will] take all steps necessary  to achieve  before January 1, 1980 the objective.  t-of
reducing  emissions by at least 60 kg/s], by injection  into the Alsarian  sub-soil or by other means,
subject to an agreement  on the technical  terms and conditions  of the project and on the financing
of the costs relating thereto."  In fact, the agreement did not come into force until 1985. due to
delays by France (Bimie and Boyle, 1992, p. 244).
Despite these difficulties.  the Rhine Chlorides  Convention  is important  insofar as it serves as an
example for sharing the costs of pollution  control among  all the riparians. rather than imposing
these on the polluters alone or on the victims (beneficiaries)  alone.
The primary beneficiary of the agreement is the Netherlands. and this country also pays the
largest share of the costs of pollution abatement  Since Dutch emissions do not affect the other
riparians, this would appear to be an example of the "victim  pays principle."  However, France
and Germany bear a large share of the cost of abatement, even though they are not affected by
the concentration of salts in the Rhine.  France and Germany agreed to contnrbute  toward the
total cost for reasons of  "equity'  (LeMarquand, 1977).  Furthermore, Switzerland, the state
farthest upstream, agreed to contribute  toward the cost of abatement,,  even though it would not
benefit directly.  The Swiss contnrbution  was based on the principle of "solidarity,  defined by
the OECD  Principles  on Transfrontier  Pollution as seeking  " -- as far as possible  an equitable
balance of rights and obligations as regards the zones concerned by transfrontier pollution."
LeMarquand  (1977, p. 119) argues that this position reflects the playing of a possible reciprocal
and repeated game:  "No doubt [the Swiss] also feel that solidarity on this issue could be
advantageous  to them on other subsequent  sues-":
3.  Theory
3.1 Unidirectional Externalities
Suppose an upstream country, labelled U, inflicts damage on its downstream  neighbor, l.  To
be more precise, assume that U emits a pollutant into the shared river.  (Et  is not essential that
the  externality be transmitted through a pollutant; the example could just  as  well be  the
extraction of water or the silting of a river.  What is essential to the discussion which follows
is that the externality is unidirectional.) U can abate its pollution at a cost C(Q) (marginal  cost
C'(Q)), where Q is the level of abatement. This abatement  yields D a benefit B(Q) (marginal
benefit B'(Q)).
To work-  through a solution to this problem, we need to specify the mles of the game. One such
rule may be supplied  by international  law, and that concerns the sttrus quo point of negotiations.
Absent a coop-.rative  agreement, what outcome  should we expeL.  to observe?
The law of international  water resources offers two extreme rules relating to property rights (see
Caponera,  1983).  The doctrine  of  unlimited teritorial  sovereignty  states that  a countly  has
exclusive rights to the use of waters within its territory.  This means that a country may pollute- 15  -
its rivers as  much as  it wants.  This view, sometimes called the Harmon Doctrine, was
forcefully expressed by the Attorney General of the United States. M. Harmon. in 1895, when
commenting  on Mexicogs  claim to water oiginating north of the border.
"..  the fundamental principle  of international law is the absolute sovereignty  of every
Nation as against all others within its own territory... all exceptions, therefore, to the
power of a Nation within its own temtory  must be traced up to the consent of the Nation
itself  They can flow from no other leaitimate source.
In contrasL  the doctrine of unlimited territorial integtriy states that the quantity and quality of
water available to a countrv cannot be altered by another country.  This rule implies that the
upstrean country cannot pollute the shared river.
Now. these two doctrines clearly imply very different pre-bargainirg positions. If the doctrine
of unlimited territorial sovereignty is  accepted by both parties, and if each party seeks to
maximize its own payoff, then the upstream country will ignore the damages from pollution
downstream. To maximize its own payoff, the upstream country will abate its emissions up to
the point where the marginal cost of abatement  equals the marginal  benefit of abatement  to itself.
In an extreme example, where the upstream country does not benefit at all from abatement, no
abatement will be undertaken in the absence of bargaining, even if the downstream country
would  benefit substantially  from upstream  abatement. Under the doctrine  of unlmited territorial
integrity, the pre-bargaining  position is very different-  The upstream country cannot emit any
pollution into the river,  even if the downstram  country would not suffer any damage from
pollution  Whichever doctrine is  accepted, provided pollution upstream causes  damage
downstream and provided abatement is costly. the  pre-bargaining outcome is likely to be
inefficient  Both parties could potentially  be made better off though bargaining.
3.2 The Coase Theorem
One might expect that two such different  doctrines  would result in two different  post-bargaining
outcomes.  However, Coase's (1960) famous "theorem' shows that this is not the case if (see
Mdler. 1990): (i) both countries know the functions  C and B; (ii) there are no transactions costs;
(iii) the pollution of the river can be seen in isolation  from other international  relations; and (v)
the functions  C and B are independent  of the legal doctrine employed (iLe.,  there are no income
effects).
To see this. consider Figure 2.  If the doctrine of unlimited territorial sovereignty  is applied, U
has no obligation  to abate any of its emissions. However. that does not mean that no abatement
will be undertaken.  The status quo point for negotiation  is the 0 intercept.  At this point, the
benefit to D of abating one unit of emission is higher than the cost to U of undertaking that
'The quote is taken from Caponera (1980), p- 7-16  -
FIGURE  2
.-  0.
- o  a-  0  a:  a
abatement.  Indeed, incrementally  this holds true up to Q'.  Hence, D should be willing to pay
U  a  greater  amount than  D  would be willing to  accept to  abate its emissions up  to  Q7.
Bargaining may therefore yield gains from trade.  If the doctrine of unlimited territorial integrity
is accepted. then U cannot pollute the river without D's approval.  Let us suppose that pollution
is eliminated when abatement is Q. Then the saus  quo point for negotiation is Q.  But at this
level of abatement, the marginal cost of abatement to  U exceeds the marginal benefit to D.
Clearty, U would have an incentive to pay D for the privelege of polluting the river by one unit,
and D would have an incentive to accept such a payment  Exchange should continue until all
gains from trade had been exploited-that  is, until Q'  had been reached.  This  is of course
precisely the same level of abatement  which the two parties would agree on under the alternative
legal doctrine.  It  is also the level of abatement which maximizes joint  net benefits;  i.e.
aggregate net benefits can be no higher than B(Q) - C(Q')-  In contrast to the pre-bargaining
outcomes, the post-bargaining outcome is efficient.
According to the Coase Theorem, the bargaining problem is not one of determining Q  but of
determining how the gains to cooperation  should be shared between the two parties.  The sharing
of the  gains is the  topic of cooperative game theory and is discussed later  in this  section.
Determining the magnitude of those gains does, however, depend on the legal doctrie  that is
accept.ed  by both parties, as discussed below.
3.3 Determining  the gains to  cooperation
The gain to cooperation is the difference in the aggregate  payoff between the noncooperative  and
full cooperative outcomes.  The noncooperative outcome is the outcome which would result in
the absence of bargaining.  The full cooperative outcome is that which maximizes the aggregate
payoff.  In the case of the prisoners' dilemma game shown in Figure la,  the gain is (5 +  5) -
(3 +  3) =4.- 17-
The gains to cooperation must be calculated relative to the outcome where U and D do not
cooperate, and as we have seen this outcome depends  on the legal doctnine  that is accepted by
the two parties.  Under the doctrine of unlimited territorial sovereignty,  U receives net benefits
=  - C(O)  =  0, and D receives net benefits 7rD  =  B(O)  =  0, if negotiations  faiL  Hence, the
status quo or disagreement  point in this case is (0, 0), which is labelled d1 in Figure  3.  Under
the doctrine of unlmited territorial integrity, zru =  - C(Q) and rD  =  B(Q) if negotiations  fail
The status quo or disagreement  point for this case is labelled d2 in Figure 3.
If both countries cooperate fully, aggregate net benefits will be B(Q) - C(Q}  Assuming that
side payyments  are permitted, these aggregate net benefits can be shared in a number of ways.
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The gain in net benefits depends on B(Q) - C(Q)  and the disagreement point, which is itself
determined by  the accepted property rights  regime.  In  the  case of  unlimited territorial
sovereignty, the gains are given by the vertical distance  between the SP line as it hits the y axis
and d1. In the case of unlimited territorial integrity, the gain is given by the vertical distance
between the SP line and the disagreement  point d2. For the case shown in Figure 3, the gain
is smaller in this latter case.-- 18 -
For  the example given in Figure 3, it is plainly in the interest of U to claim the doctrine of
unlimited territorial sovereignty, for the worst payoff for U under this doctrine is 0, whereas the
best payoff for U under the alternative  doctrine of unlimited territorial integrity is B(Q) - C(Q)
- B(Q) <  O  Similarly, it is in the interest of D to claim the alternative doctrine, because the
best payoff for D under the doctrine of unlimited territorial sovereignty; B(Q') - C(Qt) is less
than the worst payoff for D under the doctrine of unlimited territorial integrity, B(Q).
3.4 The Coase Theorem in an international  context
While elegant and illuminating,  there are a number of problems with the Coase theorem in an
international context  Most importantly, there does not exist a third party which can impose
either doctrine on the two countries.  Agreements between parties must be self-enforcing (see
Barrett, 1990). But if that is true, then why should D accept the first doctrine or U the second?
The doctrine Avhich  is most attractive to one country is least attractive to the other.  As Caponera
(1983. p.  178) notes, "In the present world, application  of the two doctrines mentioned would
breed permanent conflict"
Further, it is misleading  to view the problem in isolation  of other matters, a point which is made
by all three case studies in Section 2.  If a country accepts a doctrine in one instance, then the
precedent may be held against it in another.  As an example, if U were downsteam from a
country Z. then U may not wish to support the doctrine of unlimited territorial sovereignty
against D for fear that the same doctrine will be turned against U by Z  One can also imagine
the example of a country U which is upstream, but also downwind, of D.  The doctrine which
may spare U the costs of water pollution control may also impose upon U the obligation to pay
D for the costs of air pollution control.  Hence, it may not be in the self-interest  of either party
to endorse unreservedly one of the doctrines.
Related to this point. Miter  (1990, pp. 86-87) notes that countries are typically involved in a
web of international  relations:
"Two countries with a tsboundary  polluzion  problem will have a large number of
links other than the flow of pollutants  from  one of the coimares  to the other..  One
country may want to make concessions in order to  improve friendly neighbourhood
relations and thereby achieve advantages  in other areas of mutual interest."
We have already seen the importance  of intemational  relations  generally  to negotiated  settlements
in the case of the Columbia River Treaty. In this case, the agreement over sharing the benefits
of development of the Columbia River seemed to have been linked to other border issues.
In the case of the Indus Waters Treaty, bad relations  between India and Pakistan actually dictated
that joint development  of the waters for joint gain be ruled out.- 19  -
A dispute between the United States and Mexico provides another example of linkage. 8 In the
1960s, the concentration of salt in the waters of the Colorado River increased dramatically on
the Mexican side due to the drainage into this river from the Wellton-Mohawk  Irrigation Project,
just across the border in Arizona.  Technically, the United States could have ignored Mexico's
request to remedy the problem-that at least was the view of the State Department-  This is
because the 1944 Water Treaty between Mexico and the United States did not mention water
quality explicitly.,  and stated that Mexico would have to accept its share of water under the treaty
"from any and all sources," including, potentially, drainage.  However, the State Departnent
believed that the United States wvould  suffer in other ways if it pressed its case.  First,  the
United States wanted to maintain good relations with Mexico for thie  resolution of orzer cross-
border issues-including illegal immigration, drugs trafficking, and trade.  While it might suit
the United States to ignore Mexico's plight in this one case, another case would be bound to
arise where the United States would suffer from activities south of the border.  Second, if the
United States argued the legal doctrine of unlimited territorial sovereignty in this case,  and
ignored Mexico's  claims, then countries other than Mexico might wish to  argue the same
.doctrine to the disadvantage  of the United States in some other case
As the above example demonstrates, while the United States may have laid claim to the Harmon
doctrine in 1895, it has not itself stuck by this claim.  Indeed, ilot  long after Harmon claimed
the United States' right to absolute sovereingty  over the use of the Rio Grande, the United States
engaged in negotiations with Mexico leading to the 1906 Convention concerning the Equitable
Distrbution  of the Waters of the Rio Grande for Irrigation Purposes.  Similarly, while India
once  claimed "full freedom-  to  draw  off such waters  as  it  needed'  from the  Indus.  the
subsequently negotiated Indus Water Treaty (see Section 3) effects an equitable apportionment
of the waters. 9
The problem with the two polar doctrines, as the above example illustrates, is that neither is
likely to be acceptable to both parties.  Suppose U invokes the doctrine of unlimited territorial
sovereignty in negotiations. Then D might well theaten  to reconsider its position on trade or
defense agreements between the two countries. Likewise. if D invokes  the doctrine of unlimited
territorial integrity, then U might well threaten to pollute the river anyway.
3.5 Rational  Threats
In many cases, the disagreement point for neagotiations  will not be decided by le-gal  doctrines
alone but by the threats that countnes can make regarding the actions they wouild  choose in the
event that negotiations  break-  down.  In some cases, this disagreement point will be given by the
noncooperative  outcome. However, in general, a country will do better in negotiations if it can
commit itself to a particular action in the event of a break down in negotiations. Such strategic
behavior can enhance the country's strength at the negotiating table.
8~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
8For a discussion of this case, see LeMarquand (1977)
9Birnie  and Boyle (1992), p. 219.20  -
As an example of threats which may alter the  strengths of different parties in  negotiations,
consider the continuing negotiations between Turkey and Syria over border security and the
shared waters  of  the  Euphrates.  In  the  run-up  to  negotiations in  January  1993, Turkey
announced plans to start irrigating along the Harran plain from May, diverting more water from
the Ataturk reservoir, upon which Syria relies for hydro-electricity  production. Syria has so-ught
to link negotiations over water to security, since Turkey relies on Syria to curb rebels of the
Kurdish Workers'  Party (Murray-Brown, 1993).  Threats by both parties may be seen as a
prelude to a negotied  settlement over bodt s-zurity and the use of the Euphrates.
To understand the significance  of.such  threats, consider the following  simple example, illustrated
in Figure 4a.  Two countries are negotiating over the constuction  of a water projecL  Each
country has a binary choice: it can build a project on its side of the border or not build.  The
outcome which maximizes collective net benefits is where country A builds the project on its
territory, and B does not build.  This outcome yields A net benefits of $1, and B net benefits
of $9.
Figure  4
(a) Disageement  Game
Country B
Build  Don't
Build  3,-5  1,9
Country  A
Don't  2,0  -1,1
This game has a unique equilibrium.  If A chooses to build, B's best response is to not build.
If A chooses not to build, B's best response is again not to build.  Given that B will not build
whatever A does, A's best response is to build.  Hence, A will build the project and B will not.
Since this outcome will result even if negotiations fail, the outcome represents the equilibrium
disagreement point for  negotiations.  Since aggregate net benefits cannot be  increased by
choosing some alternative set of actions, bargaining is likely to result in both parties receiving
their disagreement point payoffs, (1,9).-21  -
This game is not very.  interesting insofar as both players choose to do what is in their collective
interest (i.e., the outcome is efficient, in contrast to the prisoners' dilemma).  However, suppose
that both countries could commit to undertaking a particular action in the event that a negotiated
solution could not be  reached.  Then Country A might be able to  improve its negotiated
settlement if it could commit to not building the project on its side of the border if negotiations
failed.  Such a commitment would not alter the aggregate of payoffs but it would alter the
distribution of payoffs.
We know that the negotiated settlement  will involve A building the project and B not building,
because this outcome maximizes joint net benefits.  The real problem for negotiation is how the
,gain  to cooperation should be divided. The gain is calculated relative to the disagreement point.
Given that this is a two player game, it is plausible to assume that this gain will be divided
evenly between the  two parties.  (This happens to  be the  Nash bargaining solution with
transferable utility.  It is also the negotiated outcome suggested by the theory of focal points;
see below.)-
Associated with the above disagreement game is a threat game.  In the threat game, each player
commits to a particular action in the event that negotiations fail.  The payoff each party receives
is calculated by subtracting the total payoffs to both parties under the disagreement point from
the  maximum joint  payoff  (10).  If both  countries build,  aggregate net benefits are  -$2.
Compared with this disagreement point, a negotiated outcome can mcrease net benefits by $10 -
(-$2), or $12.  Dividing these gains equally, Country A would receive a payoff of $3  +  $6,
or $9.  and country B a payoff  of -$5 +  $6, or $1.  In other words,  if both countries  can commit
to build in the.  event that negotiations fail, the negotiated outcome will require that A build and
B not build, and that B transfer $8 to A, such that the payoffs now equal (9,1).
Figure 4
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To determine which threat each country would want to make, we need to calculate the payoffs
associated with all feasible choices.  These are shown in the threat game in Figure 4b.  As it
happens, the equilibrium to this game is not that both countries build.  It is instead that neither
country builds.  Given this disagreement point, the equilibrium negotiated outcome with rational
threats involves A building and B not building, and B transferring $3 to A.  The equilibrium
payoffs are then (4,6).
Now, in this example, threats pose no problem for efficiency; they only serve to change the
distribution of  the gains from cooperation.-- However, the  fact that countries could gain in
making such threats credible suggests that they may be willing to use up resources toward this
end.  In other words, in attempting  to improve their negotiating  positions, countries may eat up
some of the potential gains from cooperation.
The game depicted in Figure 4 is based loosely on the Columbia River case.  In this case, joint
net benefits are maximized by -the construction of water storage facilities on the Canadian side
of the Columbia River.  If these facilities were not constructed, then the United States might
build facilities south of the border, but these would be less efficient. The United States believed
that Canada would want to develop the Columbia River on its side of the border anyway, and
so felt that it did not need to compensate Canada much for constructing the project.  The Nash
equilibrium to  this game therefore invlves  Canada constructing the project, and the United
States receiving a  large portion of the benefits without having to  make a  side payment to
Canada.
However, later in negotiations British Columbia threatened to construct an alternative project
and to abandon development  of the Columbia River.  This alternative to a negotiated settlement
would harm the United States, and hence put British Columbia in a strong negotiating  position.
As it happens, this threat by British Columbia was perceived by the United States to be credible,
and it is for that reason that British Columbia was able to secure a more attractive settlement in
the 1961 treaty.
3.6 Bargaining  with more than 2 countries
Bargaining  can be quite different when there are three countries than when there are two. Table
I indicates that there are about 50 river basins that are shared by three or more countries, and
so our analysis of bargaining should be extended.
Consider the following game. 10 There are three countries, and each has one ton of hazard--us
waste to dispose of  Each country receives a payoff of -n for every n tons disposed of in its
own territory.  The waste must be disposed of in the territories of the three countries.  Since the
aggregate payoff to all three countries is the same, irrespective  of the final distribution of waste,
the game is zero sum.  That is, every allocation of waste is a Pareto optimal allocation.
" 0See Shubik (1987, pp. 541-2).- 23 -
Now, the rules of a game specify what it is that the players may do.  Let us suppose that
international law imposes the doctrine of unlimited territorial integrity upon all players.  Then,
no country can dispose of its waste in another country without that country's consent.  Hence,
the status qzuo  is where each country retains its waste-  Since the status quo is a Pareto optimal
allocation, no reallocation would be preferred by the parties.  In particular,  no coalition of
countries could secure a higher payoff for itself by departing from the initial allocation; the
initial allocation is thus a unique core allocation-
Let us now suppose that international law imposes upon all players the doctrine of unlimited
territorial sovereignty. Then countries  have the right to dump their waste wherever they choose.
Any coalition of two countries can guarantee itself an aggregate  payoff of -1 by dumping its two
tons of waste in the ffiird  country and accepting that the third country will dump its waste in one
of the two countries forming the coalition.  Let us suppose that countries 1 and 2 form the
coalition and decide to share their aggregate  payoff of -1 equally. Then the payoffs are (-.5, -.5,
-2).  But country 3 can offer to strike a deal with country 2 which would mak-e  2 better off, such
as the allocation (-2. -.25, -.75).  However, countries 1 and 3 can dominate this proposal with
(-.5, -2, -.5).  And so on  In other words, the set of core allocations in this example is empty;
under the doctrine of unlimited territorial sovereignty, a bargaining outcome (based  on the core)
does not exist
This example points to another problem with the Coase Theorem, for it demonstrates that the
existence of  a bargaining outcome (based on  the theory of  the  core) does depend on the
assignment of property rights.-" Under one regime, the game has a unique core allocation-the
intial  allocationu Under the other regime, the core does not exist
Now, I have assumed here that one of the doctrines is imposed on the three countries, and yet
we know that there does not exist a third party which can impose  a doctrine on countries.  For
this example, however, there  is  only one allocation which, intuitively, would seen  to  be
acceptable to all of the parties, and that is the allocation (-1, -1, -1).  This allocation is a focal
point, as it entails an equal division of the costs of waste disposal (see Section 3 8); that is, the
allocation (-1, -1, -1) is in some obvious sense equitable.
The three parties might arrive at this outcome from a number of different directions.  Most
obviously, they might agree to accept the doctrine of unlimited territorial integrity.  Suppose
instead that  the  parties agree  to  the  doctrine of  unliited  territorial  sovereignty.  Then,
negotiations will start from the allocation (-1, -1,  -1).  We know that any coalition of two
countries can improve on this allocation under this doctrine. However, countries might choose
not to deviate from this allocation, for each country would know that, whatever allocation it
agrees to as part of a coalition, another coalition  would inevitably  be formed subsequently  which
might yield this country a lower payoff.
"This point is made by Dasgupta and Miler  (1994).-24  -
Alternatively,  the parties might wish to ignore the question  of property rights altogether-one
reason being that doctrines should apply in all situations, and as we have already seen, the
doctrine that is most attractive to a country in one situation  may not be attractive in another.
Instead, the countries  might agree to a principle which  applies  only in this game.  For example,
the parties might agree to the "proximity  principle", which states that  waste should be disposed
of near to where it is generated.  This results in the outcome  (-1, -1, -1) without recourse to
acceptance  of a property rights  regime. This is exactly  how the members  of the European  Union
have resolved their dispute  about the disposal  of hazardous  waste.
In the above example, the core is either unique or empty, depending on how the rules of the
game are specified.  In other cases, the core may be very large.  To see this, consider the
following  example.  A river runs through 3 countries: It starts in country 1. and then flows
through  countries  2 and 3 in succession. Counties I and 2 each emit one unit of pollution into
the river.  This pollution  harms only countries  that are downstream. The pollution  can be abated
at a cost, and the level of abatement undertaken by player i is x,, 1 >  x- >  0.  The payoffs are
7rl =  -l-5x1 ,  r2 =  x1 7-5x 2 r3 =  X] +  x,.  This game,  in cmras  to the previous one,  is a
positive sum game.
Under the doctrine of unlimited territorial intgrity,  countres 1 and 2 must abate.  all of their
pollution in the srau  quo.  The outcome yields (-1-5, 0.5, 2).  Since the fuU cooperative
outcome  does not yield a higher aggregate  payoff, the core is unique  and consists of the initial
allocation- In this sense, this game is similar to the hazardous  waste game.
Under the doctrine of unlimited territorial sovereignty, no abatement is undertaken (in the
absence  of side payments),  and the payoffs  (X 1,  r,z,  7r3) are (0, 0, 0).  Under the full cooperative
outcome, xl = x2 =  1, and aggregate  net benefits rise from 0 to 1.  If players 1 and 2 cooperate
on their own, they can do no better than to set xi =  x2 =  0, and so all three players receive a
payoff of 0.  If players I and 3 cooperate  on their own, they can do no better than to set x  =
0.  Similarly, player 2 can do no better than to set x 2 =  0; hence, all three players receive a
payoff of 0.  If players 2 and 3 cooperate  on their own, they will set x2 =  1.  Player 1 can do
no better than to set x 1= 0.  Hence, 7r, =  0, and 7r,  +  7r3 =  .5.
The allocation  (a, b, c) is in the core if a, b, c > O, b + c. >  .5, and a + b +c=  1.  Uearly
many allocations satisfy these requirements,  including  (1/3, 1/3, 1/3), (.5, .5, 0), (0, .5, .5),
and (.5, 0, .5).  These allocations  vary substantially. What allocation  would players agree to
accept?  The core concept does not tell us,  although there are other solution concepts m
cooperative  game theory that do have  unique  outcomes.  For example,  the Shapley  values  for this
-game  are (.17, .42, .42), and these might be taken to be an arbitrated solution.  This concept
gives a greater payoff to players 2 and 3 because these players can secure a greater payoff by
forming their own coalition  than can player I in combination  with either 2 or 3.
Of course, a doctrine  cannot be imposed. What kind of outcome  might the countries negotiate?
Let us suppose  that they wish  to ignore  committing  to either doctrine. Now, the aggregate  gains
to cooperation  are highest when xl =  x2 =  1, and so we should expect that these abatement-25  -
levels will be a part of the negotiated  settlement. However, country 1 will almost certainly
claim that it should be compensated  in some way for undertaking  the abatement; after all,
country 1 is not required to do so under the doctrine of territorial sovereignty.  One possible
outcome  is that the paruies  agree to split the difference between the allocations  under the two
doctrines, (-1.5, .5. 2) and, say, (.17, .42, 42)- This results in the outcome  (-.67, .46, 1.21).
Under this outcome,  country 1 receives  partal compensation  for undertaking  abatement  which
benefits the other parties, while county  3 pays for a portion of the abatement  undertaken by
country 1.  There is nothing compelling  about this outcome except that it is a compromise
between  the two extremes, and in this sense may be seen to be equitable. The resolution  to the
Chlorides  case, discussed  in Section  2.3, is consistent  with this outcome  Recall  that in that case
the outcome was efficient, and the upstream  countries agreed to pay for a portion of the costs
of reducing  pollution  on the basis of equity, where "equity"  reflected "an equitable  balance of
rights and obligations."
3.7 The doctrine of reasonable and equitable use and development
In fact, the practice of international  law has generally  not allocated  property rights  to one party
or the other, as the Coase Theorem suggests might be done, but has rather recognized an
alternative doctrine: that of equitable utilization (see, e.g.,  Birnie and Doyle, 1992).  As
examples,  the Permanent  Court of Intemational  Justice, in the River Oder case, reasoned that
there existed  a community  of interest in navigation  among all ripaian  states, based on equality
of rights over the whole navigable  course of the river  The tnrbunal  deciding the Lac Lanow
arbitration  similarly  recognzed that though  France  could carry out water diversion  works within
its own territory, it nevertheless  had an obligation  to consult Spain, which shared the waters,
and to safeguard  Spain's rights to the watercourse.
The International  Law Commission  (ILC), set up by the United Nations to encourage "...the
progressive  development  of international  law and its codification,"  agreed the Helsinki Rules  on
the Uses of the Waters of International  Rivers in 1966, and in Article IV stated that "Each basin
State is entided, within its territory, to a reasonable  and equitable  share in the beneficial uses
of the waters of an international  drainage  basin."  Similarly,  Article 5 of the LLC's 1991 draft
report states:
"1  Watercourse States shall in  their respective territories utilize an international
watercourse in an equitable and reasonable  manner.  In particular, an international
watercourse  shall be used and developed  by watercourse  States  with a view to attaining
optimal -ilization thereof and benefits  therefrom consistent  with adequate  protection  of
the watercourse.
-"2  Watercourse States shall participate  in the use, development  and protection of an
international  watercourse in an equitable  and reasonable  manner.  Such participation
includes both the right to utilize the watercourse and the duty to cooperate in the
protection an development  thereof, as provided in the present articles."- 26 -
What does "equitable  and reasonable" mean?  The ILC provides no clear guide, but it does list
relevant factors to be taken into account. including: '2
"(a) geographic, hydrographic. hydmiogical, climatic, ecological  and other factors of a
natural character;
(b) the social and economic needs of the watercourse States concerned;
(c) the effects of the use or uses of the watercourse in one watercourse State on other
watercourse States;
(d) existing and potential uses of the watercourse;
(e) conservation, protection. development  and economy of use of the water resources of
the watercourse and the costs of measures taken to that effect.
(t) the availability of alternatives, of corresponding value, to a particular planned or
existing use-".
Part (f) recognizes that the negotiated outcome  must reflect the opportunities which the countries
have of acting unilaterally.  Of course, it is this set of opportumities  which determines the
disagreement point for negotiations.  and as we have seen countries have an incentive  to influence
this set of opportunities.
Related to this doctrine is another princple included  in the International  Law Commission's draft
text.  This principle stares that "Watercourse states sball utilize an mternational  watercourse m
such a  way as not to  cause appreciable harm to other watercourse States."  The qualifier
"appreciable" would seem to distance this principle from that of unlimited territorial integrity
Article 21 discusses obligations in the context of pollution:
'Watercourse States shall, individually  or jointly. prevent, reduce and control pollution
of an international  watercourse that may cause appreciable harm to other watercourse
States or to their enviromnent, including  harn  to human health or safety, to the use of
the waters for any beneficial purpose or to the living resources of the watercourse."
' 2Birnie and Boyle (1992) note that this list of factors provides nothing more than a guide
to deciding how "equitable  and reasonable" should be defined in any particular case.- 27 -
In fact, few treaties prohibit pollution outright.' 3 Most tolerate some pollution, and indeed
'equitable utilization" is seen to include use of a watercourse  for the disposal of pollutants.
Where this principle runs into difficulty  is in failing to define "appreciable  harm.n
3.8 Focal Points
There does not exist a complete,  compelling  theory  which predicts how  the gains to cooperation
wili be distributed.  However. concerns for equity and reasonableness  do loom large in  the
analysis of negotiated outcomes. Schelling's (1960)  brilliant work on focal points argues that
the "fair" or "reasonable' outcome  as perceived  by the public  becomes  the focus of negotiations,
not because such an outcome is necessarily  just but because this outcome is known by both
parties, known to be known  by both parties, etc-  It is a point on which negotiations  focus.
Imagine  that two countries  are negotiating  over the construction  of a joint project for irrigation.
The gains  to cooperation  are understood  by both parties to equal $100.  One party might open
negotiations  by saying that it should get $99 and the other,just  $1  But the latter party would
know that the former would get nodting,  if an agreement  were not reached, and so knows that
the 99-1 split is something from which the former country would be willing to retreaL  Of
course, the former country would know this as well, and so is unlikely  to make the 99-1 offer
to begin with.  The only compelling  division  in this case is 50-50, and it is likely  that this is the
division  to which the two parties will agree- In fact, equal division  of the gains to cooperation
has formed the basis for real negotiations. As an example, the Convention  of 8 January 1927
between Turkey and the USSR  states:
"The two Contracting  Parties shall  have the use of one half of the water from the rivers,
streams and springs  which coincide  with the frontier line between  Turkey  and the Union
of Soviet Socialist  Republics  '14
Imagine  now that the two parties also  know that 75% of the river flows through  one country and
just 25% through the other-  Then it is not obvious  that the two parties would agree to split the
gains  to cooperation  50-50. They may  instead  decide on the 75-25 split. Alternatively,  imagine
that one country has twice the population  of the other.  Then it is possible that the ne,otiators
might agree to allocate  two dtirds of the gain to the country  with the larger population  in order
to equalize the gain per capita.
'3Exceptions  include  the 1956 Czechoslovakia-USSR  Frontier  Agreement, the 1961 Polish-
USSR  Frontier Treaty, the 1964 Finland-USSR  Agreement  Concerning  Frontier Watercourses,
the 1971 Declaration on Water Resources by Argentina and Uruguay, and the 1971 Act of
Santiago  Covering  Hydrologic  Basins  by Argenina and Chile. See Birnie and Boyle (1992), p.
225.-
'4See United Nations (1975),  p. 46.-28 -
It is plain why the ILC list of factors might prove relevant to negotiations. One other factor
which can influence  negotiations  is precedent. As an example, the Rbine Chlorides  Convention
discussed in Section 2 employs the exact same allocation for sharing the.  costs of pollution
control as was agreed in 1972, even though the parameters  of the problem chanrged  by the time
the Convention  was negotiated  in 1976 and entered into force in 1985.
3.9 Reciprocal Exteralites
Reciprocal  externalities  arise where each country  imposes  externalities  on all others which share
the resource.  Examples include extraction of water from, or pollution of, a shared lake or
acquifer.  Reciprocal externalities  differ from unidirectional  externalities  in that there exit  a
diect  means by which one party may punish or  reward the others'  behavior, though not
necessarily substantially.  Suppose all parties which share a resource negotiate a cooperative
agreement. If a party to the agreement chooses  to withdraw, the others may punish this party
by increasing  their pollution enmssions  or by increasin  their rate of extraction. This threat of
punishment, if credible. may deter this country from withdrawing.  Similarly, if a country
accedes  to  the  agreement,  the  other  parties  may  reward  this  behavior  by  increasing  their
pollution  abatement  or by reducing  even further their level of abstraction  A promise to reward
accession, if credible, may serve to increase  the number of countries  which cooperate.
Wh-at  prevents reciprocal externalities  from being entirely internalized  is the requirement that
such cooperative  agreements be self-enforcing  In contrast to agreements which mternmaize
intranational  externalities,  international  agreements  cannot  be enforced  by a thrd  party or central
authority. Instead, the agreement  must include  mechanisms  which by themselves  can sustain a
cooperative  agreement
The nature and significance  of self-enforcing  international  agreements  have been analyzed in a
number of papers (see, for example, Barrett 1994a, 1994b). The point to make here is that, in
general, such agreements  may improve  upon the non-cooperative  or anarchic outcome  but may
-not  be capable of mimicing  the ful  cooperative  outcome.
To see this, consider the following  model in which the number of signatories to an agreement,
the  obligations of the  signatories, and  the  actions of  non-signatories are  all  determined
endogenously. A shared water resource is being polluted  by 5 identical countries. Each has a
net benefit function which depends  on its own abatement  and aggregate  abatement  as follows:
2
h 0  =Q - q2B2  0  (1
where II; is the ith country's net benefits,  ch  is i's abatement  and Q is aggregate  abatement  (i.e.,
Q =4  j  =  1,.-,5).-29
Each  non-signatory will choose. a  level of  abatement which maximizes (1) but  under the
assumption that its abatement  choice will not affect the choice made by other countries.  Non-
signatories therefore face a simple calculus  problem, and the resulting  abatement  level for each
non-signatory is q=  1  If there is no cooperation,  each country abates one unit, Q  =  5 and
II =  4.5.
Suppose, however, that x countries  cooperate  and choose  abatement  levels which maximize their
collective net benefits,
Es(x)  =  x [x  +  (5-x)]  - 2  (2)
where 115  is the net benefit received by each signatory  and q, is the level of pollution abated by
each signatory. The value of qb  which  maximizes (2) is q, =  x.  Given  x signatories, each earns
Yx)  =  x2+  (5-x)  - x2  (3)
Each non-signatory  earns
I[,(x)  =  2  +  (5 -x)  - 12  (4)
Equations (3) and (4) are shown in Figure 5-  It is eas  to prove, and this is reflected in the
figure, that the self-enforcing  LEA  consists of 3 countries.  Each signatory receives a payoff of
DQ(3)  =  6.50, and each non-signatory receives a payoff of 1,(3)  =  10.50.  Non-signatories
receive a higher payoff because they free-ride.  However, no signatory has an incentive to
withdraw from the agreement.  Further, no non-signatory has an incentive to accede to the
agreement.  The agreement consisting  of 3 signatories,  each undertaking 3 units of abatement,
is therefore self-enforcing.
However, the cooperative agreement is incomplete;  two countries cannot be induced to join-
Furthermore, aggregate  abatement  and net benefits are 11 and 40.5, respectively,  under the self-
enforcing agreement but 25 and 62.5 under the fiull  cooperative  outcome.
W  hat limits the ability of countres to sustain a better self-enforcing  agreement is the mechanism
for free-nder deterrence in this model-  Signatories reward countries which accede to the
agreement by  increasing their abatement, and punish countries which withdraw from the
agreement by decreasing their abatement.  These rewards and punishments are,  of course,
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small to sustain the fuill  cooperative  outcome. Alternative  models may be able to improve on
this outcome- For example, if the game of choosing  abatement  levels were played repeatedly
(and infinitely often), then the full cooperative outcome might be sustainable provided the
number of countries sharing the resource is not too large (see Barrett, 1994a).  In general,
however, self-enforcement  means that fuill  cooperative  outcomes  are not always sustainable.
3.10 Economies of Scale
Consider now a  case where the provision of  a public good exhibits economies of  scale.
Examples might be the abatement  of pollution  dumped into a shared water resource znd flood
control.  Suppose that tvo countries can produce two units of the public good for $2 per unit,
but that individually  each country can produce a single  unit of the public good for $3 per unit.





A  Produce  3,3  -0-5.2.5
Don't  2.5,-0.5  0.0
There are two pure strategy equilibna to this game: (produce, produce) and (don't, don't).  If
B does not produce the good, A's best reply is not to produce the good-  Likewise, if A does
not produce the good, then B will not produce the good-  Yet, if A or B do produce the good,
then the other country's best response is also to produce the good.
While both of these outcomes are equilibria, if the two parties can communcate, then they will
agree to produce the good jointly.  This is because both countries prefer this outcome to the
alternative of (don't,  don't).  Unlik-e  the famous prisoners' dilemma game, which depicts the
provision of public goods in the absence of economies of scale, both parties can sustain the
jointy preferred outcome  because it is an equilibrium- All the parties need to do is coordinate
their choice of actions.-
4. Concluding Remarks
Water is a scarce resource, and is often not confined within territorial boundaries.  These two
observations  suggest that conflicts  may arise over the use of shared water resources. When such
boundaries lie within the borders of a federal state, the conflict  may be peacefully and efficiendy
resolved.  As an example, the United States Constitution allows for the continued use of
"compacts" or agreements between states, which had been employed during colonial times,
subject to Congressional  consent. However, disputes concerning such agreements can be taken
to the Supreme Court. and the court's decision can be enforced by the federal government-.
Indeed, the federal government  may itself impose an allocation upon states if they fail to reach
agreement themselves.' 5
'*See  Muys (1976). The Boulder Canyon  Project Act of 1928 conferred upon the Secretary
of the Interior the authority to apportion the waters of the Colorado River at Hoover Dam and
-below  among the three affected states, California, Arizona and Nevada, in the event that the
ihree  states could not agree to a tristate compact.-32  -
International  water resources are different  insofar as no third party has the authority  to enforce
an agreement  among  nation states, let alone to impose  an agreement. Such agreements  must be
self-enforcing.
The celebrated Coase Theorem states that, however property rights are assigned. the linal
allocation of resources will be efficient. This desirable  outcome is also alleged not to require
government interventinom  We  have seen,  however,  that  this  intrepretation is  wrong.
Government  intervention  is needed to assign the property rights and to enforce them.  Since
there is no third party which  can play this role in international  relations, we cannot simply rely
upon the Coase Theorem  to allocate  international  water  resources  efficiently. However, nor can
we rely upon the alternative  of centralized  resource allocation for, as stated above, there does
not exist a World Government.
The background  of internationaI  relations  is thus one of anarchy,  but precisely because a nation
can improve  its well-being  by avoiding  conflict  and by coordinating  its actions  with others, there
enst  incentives  to create instons  which can stin:  cooperation. Anarchy need not mean
mayhem.  Indeed, efficient outcomes  may emerge, as we saw in Section 3.10.  However,
efficient outcomes are not guaranteed, as we saw in Section 3.9.  In the former case,  the
interests of countries were consonant; both countries  were better off coordinating  their actions
and, having done so, neither  had an incentive  to deviate  from the agreement  In the latter case,
all parties were better off whey they cooperated fully but, having done so,  all faced some
incentive  to deviate from the agreement. The self-enforcing  agreement-the agreement which
does not leave any incentives  for deviations-may  improve  upon the outcome  where cooperation
is absent, but it may not maxmize aggregate  well-being  of affected countries.
While the Coase Theormn is principally concerned with efficiency, equity is also of great
concern in international  water agreements. The reason  is that a negotiated  settlment, apart from
expanding the aggreate  of payoffs, also determines the distribution  of this expansion-  The
allocation  of resources is something  which must be agreed by the different  parties; as already
noted, it cannot be imposed. One might say that polluters  have a de  facto right to pollute- But
such a right is not only rejected by downstream  states which suffer but also by the polluters
themselves. This is partly because these  countries  will themselves  be downstram or downwind
of some other country and partly because nations  interact on many other issues.  As we have
seen repeatedly, the  analysis of  international water agreements must be  seen against the
background  of international  relations  generally. International  law may well  give emphasis  to the
doctrine of 'equitable utilization"  of water  resources, but there is no clear definition  of what this
implies. In the Colorado  River case, the polluter, the United  States, agreed to pay for all of the
costs of providing the downstream  neighbor, Mexico, with clean water.  In contrast, in the
Rhine River case, the downstream  country, the Netherlands,  agreed to pay part-but not all-of
the costs of clean  up.  In the case of the Columbia  River Treaty, each party agreed  to incur the
costs of the project which related to construction  on its side of the border, and to share evenly
the gross benefits  of the project, rather than  to divide  the net benefits  evenly. This division  may
well have yielded the United States a smaller net benefit compared to unilateral development,
and yet the United States still ratified the treaty.--33  -
Importantly, we have seen that negotiated outcomes  need not maximize aggregate net benefits
for all  affected countries  To some. extnt,  inefficiencies can  be traced to  the  desire to
nationalize resources rather than to gain from cooperative development  The Indus Waters
Treaty is an outstanding example of this  The Indus Waters Treaty divided the Indus and its
tributaries between India and Pakistan, rather than exploiting  joint use and .development  of the
basin as a single resource. However, the agreement  was successful  in preventing  armed conflict
between the two parties, and so we must be careful here in defining "efficiency.'  Furthermore,
as we have seen, self-enforcing agreements may not be capable in all cases of maximizing
aggregate net benefits.
Agreements  for managing international  water resources must consider the efficiency and equity
aspecs jointly.  An example of this is the management  of Nile water resources  The 1959 Nile
Waters Agreement  between Egypt and Sudan did not reserve any water for upstream  riparians-
notably, Ethiopia.  Ethiopia has not claimed any rights to a portion of Nile waters, but such a
claim is inevitable  During the 1980s, Egypt did not run short of water only because Sudan did
not take its full allocation under the Nile Waters Agreement and because Ethiopia did not
withdraw any water from the basin.  Eventaly,  increased water demand will create a tension
between these states.
Whittington and  McClelIand (1992) argue  that a  basin-wide approach could  improve the
efficiency  off  th  use of Nile waters and yield benefits to all three riparians  Constmction of a
series of dams in Ethiopia would provide that country with irrigation but also yield additional
benefits: elimination  of the annual Nile flood, which would benefit both Ethiopia and Sudan; an
increase in water storage upstream in Ethiopia, which would reduce losses due to evaporation,
and hence. increase the total volume of water available-Wbittington and McClelland (1992)
believe by the same amount as would be required by proposed irrigation projects in Ethiopia;
and an increase in water storage, which would benefit Sudan's irrigation program and reduce
siltation at the Roseires Reservoir in Sudan.  Negotiations over the use of the Nile should
proceed by demonstrating  the net benefits associated  with basin-wide management, and then
identifying how these gains can be equitably  shared by the three riparians_-34 -
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